'Nothing less than its eradication'? Ireland's

hunger task force and the production of hunger by Fraser, Alistair
‘NOTHING LESS THAN ITS ERADICATION’? IRELAND’S 
HUNGER TASK FORCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF HUNGER 
  
Dr. Alistair Fraser 
Department of Geography 
National University of Ireland Maynooth 
 
Address:  
Rhetoric House 
NUI Maynooth 
Maynooth 
Co. Kidare 
Ireland 
Email: Alistair.Fraser@nuim.ie 
Phone: +353-1-708-6156 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
A wide range of actors have intervened in the debate about the causes of hunger and what 
can be done to eradicate it. One example is a 2008 report by the Hunger Task Force, a 
group of development experts mandated by the Irish government to explain the root 
causes of hunger and identify ways for Ireland to play a leading role in eradicating it. In 
this paper, I present a critical review of what the HTF report says about the causes of 
hunger. I argue the report fails to live up to its aim of commemorating those who died in 
the Irish Famine in the 1840s because it refuses to consider the role of the corporate food 
regime in the production of hunger. Further, I position the report’s flaws relative to 
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Ireland by asking how the report balances Ireland’s drive to eradicate hunger against its 
political and economic interests. I pay particular attention to Ireland’s diplomatic 
proximity to the United States and to the emerging corporate foodscape within Ireland; 
both considerations shed light on Ireland’s place within the structures and mechanisms 
that produce hunger in the contemporary period. 
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‘NOTHING LESS THAN ITS ERADICATION’? IRELAND’S 
HUNGER TASK FORCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF HUNGER 
 
Introduction 
Issues to do with hunger and its continued prevalence are high on the development 
agenda at the moment. There have therefore been some recent noteworthy interventions 
that aim to do something about it. For example, in Africa, the continent in which hunger 
is most prevalent, the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme 
(CAADP) calls for African governments to invest 10 percent of their national budgets on 
supporting agriculture. Such investments tend to pay off – for example, in Sierra Leone, 
increased government spending has dramatically boosted rice production (Africa 
Renewal, 2011: 10) – but they are not the only changes that might be pursued to reduce 
hunger. One notable set of arguments is contained in the World Bank’s 2008 World 
Development Report, Agriculture for Development, which suggests that Africa should 
pursue ‘the new agriculture’, which can be ‘led by private entrepreneurs in extensive 
value chains linking producers to consumers’ (World Bank, 2007: 8) and particularly via 
the production of non-traditional agricultural exports (think: baby sweet corn or fresh cut 
flowers [Barrett et al., 1999]). Meanwhile, from the other end of political spectrum, an 
alternative path to reducing hunger has been laid out in the Nyeleni Declaration, an 
ambitious and imaginative set of arguments for food sovereignty and radical reform of 
the global food economy (see Patel, 2009) promoted by La Via Campesina, a 
transnational movement of peasants and small-scale farmers (see Desmarais, 2007).  
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Still another contribution to the debate about hunger and how best to tackle it is a 2008 
report by the Hunger Task Force (hereafter, HTF), a group of experienced development 
and health experts mandated by the Irish government in 2006 to, ‘identify the additional, 
appropriate and effective contributions that Ireland [could] make to international efforts 
to reduce hunger and thus achieve the first Millennium Development Goal of halving 
poverty and hunger by 2015’ (HTF, 2008: 14). The HTF report, which was launched at 
the United Nations in 2008, sets out: 
 
[…] a very focused programme of actions to address three priorities, 
which the Task Force believes can have the greatest impact in reducing, 
and ultimately eliminating, hunger: Increasing the productivity of 
smallholder, mainly women, farmers in Africa; implementing programmes 
focused on maternal and infant undernutrition; and ensuring real political 
commitment, at national and international levels, to give hunger the 
absolute priority it deserves’ (p.1). 
 
It is not my intention to critique the report’s call for action. I leave it for someone else to 
consider fully whether development interventions regarding the first two priorities will 
save or improve many lives, or if the third recommendation is really the best use of 
Ireland’s resources. Rather, what interests me in this paper is what the report says and 
fails to say about the causes of hunger. Further, I want to consider what the report might 
tell us about the place in which it emerged and on which I argue it reflects: Ireland. In 
particular, I argue there is a need to position the report relative to some pertinent political 
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and economic changes in the country and Ireland’s peculiar geo-history. In this regard 
there are two absolutely crucial points to note.  
 
The first is that the HTF was formed at the height of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom; 
that is, at a time when the Irish political class was optimistic about how it could use the 
country’s wealth. Among the members of the HTF, for instance, there was a sense that 
Ireland could try to become ‘the Norway of hunger’. Thus, like Norway, which is a small, 
resource-abundant country proudly occupying its position as the world’s foremost 
advocate for conflict resolution, Ireland could aim to become a third-party mediator, an 
initiator, indeed a leader in the fight against hunger. Why hunger? This is the second 
point: Ireland knows about hunger. Between 1845 and 1852 in particular, an Gorta Mór 
(in Irish, ‘the Great Hunger’) killed one million people and caused at least another 
million to emigrate (see Nally, 2008). As Chair of the HTF, Joe Walsh, noted in the 
Preface to the 2008 report: ‘The members of the Task Force believe that Ireland, because 
of its history and commitment to development, can play a pivotal role in the global fight 
against hunger’ (HTF, 2008: 1). Other members of Ireland’s political class also 
highlighted the country’s legitimacy and indeed obligation to tackle hunger. For example, 
one month after the HTF presented its report to the UN General Assembly in 2008, 
Ireland’s President, Mary McAleese, said in Norway: 
 
Last month at the United Nations General Assembly the Irish Government 
launched its Hunger Task Force Report. Indelibly marked as we are by the 
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memory of our own Great Famine, Ireland is determined to take a strong 
leadership role on the issue (McAleese, 2008). 
 
Likewise, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in 2009, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peter Power, T.D. said: 
 
I speak today as the representative of a country which has experienced 
famine and hunger and a country whose population was decimated after 
the Great Famine of 1847. Hunger is the result of many failings. Its 
eradication, and nothing less than its eradication, must be our goal 
(Power, 2009; my emphasis). 
 
As these quotations indicate, therefore, leading members of Ireland’s political class 
argued that Irish interventions regarding hunger were not only needed but also that 
Ireland had the legitimacy to speak up. It is hard to argue against this general sentiment. 
But as I will argue in the next section, although the HTF report invokes and seeks to build 
upon memories and commemorations of the Irish Famine, it does not show any signs that 
the group sought to learn anything about the causes of that particular hunger, nor how 
those general causes might still be at work today. 
 
A critical analysis of the Hunger Task Force report 
To begin, then, consider the following, which is the report’s clearest statement about the 
causes of hunger:  
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 This inability [to obtain the basic food intake] can arise from a number of 
causes including poverty, low food production, mothers’ and fathers’ lack 
of education, poor dietary diversity and hence low nutritional quality, poor 
water, sanitation and health facilities, and climatic shocks. This indicates 
the multi-dimensional nature of the hunger problem and of the solutions 
needed to reach the MDG. The vulnerability of hungry households is 
exacerbated by gender inequality, and the impact of HIV/AIDS and other 
major diseases. The extent and causes of hunger vary by region. War and 
HIV/AIDS have been hugely important factors causing undernutrition, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In Asia, the low status and consequent 
poor education of women has affected child malnutrition and mortality.  
(p.17). 
  
There should be no doubt that hunger is multi-dimensional. It is. Hunger will always be 
the result of complex combinations of forces. Nor will there be much disagreement with 
highlighting connections between hunger and poverty, low food production, poor dietary 
diversity, or poor water, sanitation and health facilities. Or that ‘war and HIV/AIDS’ 
have been important factors in sub-Saharan Africa. However, recognizing connections or 
factors is absolutely not the same as identifying them as causes. Poverty, for example, is 
an effect of other processes and failures (although which precise mix of processes and 
failures is not at issue in this paper). Thus, what the HTF report does in this short 
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statement is ascribe causality to effects. It draws on and advances a confused, incorrect 
logic.  
 
In addition to displaying a poor grasp of hunger’s causes, the report also ignores 
numerous central features of the capitalist food economy that contribute to and, we might 
even say, produce hunger. In particular, the report should have gone beyond identifying 
relevant related conditions affecting the incidence of hunger and instead considered a 
similar set of dynamics that played a part in creating Ireland’s famine. As numerous 
contributors to the critical literature on the global food economy have noted (e.g. Akram-
Lodhi, 2007; Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010; Friedmann, 1987; McMichael, 2009; Nally, 
2011; Weis, 2007, 2010), hunger cannot be divorced from the governance of agriculture 
and international agricultural trade. For McMichael (2009), these governance 
mechanisms give rise to a ‘corporate food regime’ (CFR) that draws on World Trade 
Organization rules, particularly around the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), to enshrine 
and cement the power of corporations such as Monsanto, Cargill, or Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM) and their ilk. For example, a central aspect of the AoA is that it pushes 
for reduced trade barriers in developing countries, which helps to create a world price for 
agricultural commodities and ‘open markets’ for corporations to access and exploit, but 
yet also allows agricultural subsidies to continue in rich, northern countries. These 
arrangements enable and encourage northern agribusinesses to target ‘southern markets 
with artificially cheapened food surplus exports’ (McMichael, 2008: 209). Across Africa, 
such food imports, which total about $33bn annually (Africa Renewal, 2011: 11), 
displace domestic production, causing many peasants to leave the land, and heightening 
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their vulnerabilities to food price rises. WTO restrictions on domestic supports also 
reduce the ‘development space’ (Wade, 2007) for governments in developing countries to 
support their agricultural sectors – a shift in the place of domestic food production which 
McMichael (2008: 209) refers to as the ‘evaporation of public support of peasant 
agriculture’. Many developing world governments therefore have limited scope to ensure 
food self-sufficiency. Thus, rather than promoting national food security, what the WTO 
seeks to create is a world in which food import dependency persists; a world in which 
food security is privatized. To eat, one must pay.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious critique of the HTF report is that none of these general or 
specific features of hunger’s contemporary production are mentioned. This failure is 
especially disappointing given that Ireland’s Famine was in large part a product of similar 
forces. The disaster unfolding in Ireland in the 1840s was closely bound up with 
dominant liberal ideas in Britain about trade, state interventions relative to market forces, 
and personal responsibility (e.g. see Nally, 2008). Despite reports of desperate conditions 
in Ireland, leading British politicians rejected imposing restrictions on food exports and 
out of fear of disrupting ‘market forces’ (see also Bernstein, 1995), the British state 
refused to purchase sufficient quantities of food on the international market to extend 
support to the hungry. Other state interventions in Ireland – such as to feed the hungry via 
public works programs – were also frowned upon and limited by the British government. 
Further, although the British government reluctantly provided some funds for an Irish 
Poor Law system that fed many in county workhouses, it did so with the explicit aim of 
reforming the Irish character; that is, to force the Irish to take personal responsibility for 
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their own circumstances. Like contemporary welfare and workfare policies, the Irish Poor 
Law and the workhouse sought to ‘discipline and regulate’ (Nally 2008: 733); but also to 
balance Britain’s reluctant charitable drive against the belief that the Famine would 
‘teach the Irish crucial lessons about self-reliance’ (Bernstein, 1995: 534).  
 
It goes without saying that these same sorts of mentalities – the visions and dreams of 
imposing class power even, or indeed especially, during moments of intense suffering – 
persist today. In the 1840s, the connection between liberalism and hunger was at issue; 
today, the issue is about neo-liberalism and hunger. It follows from these points that, 
insofar as it invoked the Famine and was supported by the Irish political class in the 
memory of those who suffered in the 1840s, the HTF should have been alert to the 
possibility that contemporary hunger might have rather similar causes to the Irish case. It 
might therefore have considered how the WTO’s pro-trade, anti-interventionist rules 
protect corporations in their pursuit of profit, even if they employ unsustainable 
production practices such as the use of food grains as feed for livestock, which is 
unsustainable ecologically (Weis, 2010: 320-321), but which also helps to set a market 
price for grain that many poor people simply cannot afford to pay. Or the report could 
have considered how the WTO enables corporations to seize intellectual property rights 
over seeds, which creates a market for objects that peasant producers once controlled and 
which therefore limits their scope to access them (Kloppenburg, 2010). Nally (2011) 
imaginatively conceptualizes this process as ‘accumulation by molecularisation’; like 
Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, Nally’s argument is that capitalists 
have found a new arena for accumulation in investments in micro-scale biological 
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processes that lead to higher-yield but also infertile crop varieties that tie producers to 
seed manufacturers or lock them out of the market. The effect of this accumulation 
strategy is to devalue the right to food (Nally, 2011: 48; Huish, 2008) and harm peasant 
producers and small-scale farmers.    
 
What is all the more remarkable about the above silences in the HTF report is not only 
that the authors had scope to tackle these issues but also that it dealt with other, related 
tensions in a benign and uncritical manner. For example, the report discusses the 
importance of what it calls ‘governance failures’ at the international level and draws 
attention to the role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, but its findings 
are far from critical. In a section titled ‘A call to action: What Ireland can and should do’, 
the report states that, ‘International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have often supported 
stringent fiscal constraints to maintain macroeconomic balance at the expense of 
expenditure on service provision’ (p.45) – which is certainly one way of putting it, but is 
not by any means a sufficient statement about the role of IFIs in producing hunger. On 
top of this, the report argues that tackling failures at national levels requires ‘substantial 
increases in resources to tackle key capacity constraints’ (p.41), such as ‘agricultural 
support structures [that were] run down through neglect and partial privatisation’ (p.41). 
Unfortunately, we are left in the dark as to why those structures were neglected or 
privatized: the report fails to explicitly consider how structural adjustment programs 
reduced the scope for the state to support agricultural production by dismantling or 
privatizing agricultural research and extension (see Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2009: 45-
49). Thus, in the contemporary period, agricultural extension (like so many of other 
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former public sector services) is increasingly provided to those who can afford it by 
private consultants while millions of producers enjoy little or no support. This situation is 
in stark contrast to Europe and North America, where the state extends numerous 
supports to farmers (albeit unevenly, with the largest farm units gaining the most in many 
places) via research monies, say, but also via subsidies that encourage overproduction 
and give a boost to demand for the inputs (agri-chemicals, seeds, etc.) corporations 
produce.  
 
Another crucial point the report should have made is that neo-liberal logic seeks to lock 
in this relationship via arguing that sub-Saharan Africa need not pursue a protectionist 
stance, nor even invest in agricultural research and extension so long as it is cheaper to 
import (subsidized) food from abroad. In response to the 2008 food crisis, for example, 
WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, said, ‘we have heard calls for “food self-
sufficiency”, with some portraying import-substitution as the answer to food security. 
What this forgets is that international trade can be exactly the sort of vehicle, or 
“conveyor belt” if you will, that would allow food to travel from parts of the world with a 
surplus to parts where there is a shortage’ (Lamy, 2009). The resonances with 
liberalism’s logic in producing Ireland’s famine are clear: although a ‘conveyor belt’ 
might move food to those who need it, the obvious danger is that many consumers will be 
locked out of the market if they cannot afford the world price. Such is the logic of 
hunger’s production.  
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So far I have argued that the HTF report remained silent about how the capitalist food 
economy contributes to the production of hunger. But whilst its silences deserve critique, 
some of its arguments are also highly problematic. Consider here what changes the report 
argues are needed to boost food production. One is that the state in developing countries 
should create an ‘enabling environment’ for the private sector to take the lead in 
expanding agricultural production (p.38). The report tries to qualify this statement by 
saying, ‘The private sector in this case is primarily comprised of millions of small 
producers’, which might be the case, but which cannot hide the fact that many of those in 
the private sector whom the state will ‘enable’ will actually be capital-intensive, 
commercial agri-businesses producing for export rather than domestic consumption. A 
point the report failed to address here is that structural adjustment helped configure a 
‘neoliberal agricultural export bias’ (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010: 275) in sub-Saharan 
Africa. One outcome is a ‘bifurcated agrarian structure’, in which capital-intensive export 
oriented commercial agriculture sits besides and in some contexts has begun to take 
precedence over a peasant sub-sector (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; also Barrett et al., 1999). 
Both sectors increasingly produce for the export market as ‘a means of boosting access to 
foreign exchange, facilitating debt repayments, increasing funds for investment, 
promoting technological change and boosting rural productivity’ (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 
2010: 263). Just like the 2008 World Bank’s Agriculture for Development report (see 
Oya, 2009), the HTF report in effect calls for the state to get out of the way or, if it is to 
spend anything, it should ‘focus on expenditures with proven returns, for example, pro-
poor agricultural research, education and advisory services’ (p. 39) (on other so-called 
‘pro-poor’ initiatives, see Borras and Franco, 2010; Bakker, 2007]. 
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 The report also presents a flawed analysis of the place of smallholders within agrarian 
structures. As Pauline Peters (2004) has noted, for example, conflicts over land in sub-
Saharan Africa are increasing at the same time as inequality over access to land grows. 
And related to this is the new ‘land grab’, via which speculators, hedge funds, sovereign 
wealth funds, and agri-businesses have begun acquiring African land, thereby 
heightening tensions over land and deepening many of the differences between Africa’s 
different, bifurcated agricultural worlds (e.g. see Zoomers, 2010). In some cases, there 
are signs that investments will re-direct African agricultural production in ways that will 
further undermine domestic food production, such as by growing exclusively for foreign 
grain reserves.1 It is revealing, then, that the report does not consider the possibility that 
redistributive land reform might have a role to play in addressing smallholder 
productivity. Yet there is scope for agrarian reform all across sub-Saharan Africa and in 
Zimbabwe, at least, there is growing evidence that its ‘fast-track’ approach has begun 
delivering some positive results (e.g. see Cousins and Scoones, 2010). Promoting the 
possibilities that agrarian reform holds out would have aligned the report with many of 
the movements of peasant and small-scale farmers that constitute La Vía Campesina (see 
book review discussion on Desmarais’ (2007) book, La Vía Campesina in Volume two, 
Issue two of this journal) – but on the potential place of such movements the report was 
(tellingly) silent. Furthermore, although the report does at least note that inequalities in 
access to land matter, it awkwardly couches its statements in terms of a ‘management’ 
                                                 
1 Of course, this is exactly the sort of outcome that neoliberal proponents of structural adjustment 
promoted: as then-World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers argued, Africa should capitalize on its 
competitive advantage, even if that means receiving western pollution; or, as has begun to occur, Africa’s 
land should be used not for local or national food production if the market does not allow for it, but rather 
for more ‘efficient’ or ‘rational’ purposes, such as growing fresh cut flowers. 
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issue. For example, the report says there should be an improvement at the macro-level in 
the ‘management of, and access to, natural resources since these provide the base for 
sustainable agricultural production’. It continues, ‘Unequal or insecure access to natural 
resources perpetuates poverty and can underlie devastating conflicts’ (p.39). 
Unfortunately, the report does not tell us whether land is included in its definition of 
‘natural resources’, nor what it means when it calls for improved management of natural 
resources? Is it calling for new, private sector, managers?  
 
At the same time as the report seeks to enlist the private sector, it also ignores other 
actors with whom it could engage. For example, the report claims (rather vaguely) that 
the, ‘challenge is to build real political commitment to reducing hunger, to give the 
hungry more voice and build greater capacity at all levels of society to address hunger 
effectively and in a sustainable manner’ (p.41). It is not at all clear what this means. But 
perhaps the key word in the statement is ‘give’: what the report wants to do is give the 
hungry voice, not to support them acquiring that voice through struggle. It seems, 
therefore, that part of the challenge regarding ‘governance failures’ is to find ways to 
more successfully govern the hungry, just as the Irish Poor Law sought to change the 
ways of Ireland’s hungry masses (see Nally 2008).  
 
In summary, then, the HTF report ignores central features of the capitalist food economy, 
such as the role of the corporate food regime, despite the resonances that exist between 
the production of hunger today and the production of Ireland’s Famine in the 1840s. In 
addition, the report promotes policies that will liberate private sector actors whilst 
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ignoring the scope that exists for bottom-up or even state-led interventions that might 
reduce inequality in access to land. These failures lead me to conclude that the HTF 
report is a weak and benign intervention which fails to live up to its laudable aims of 
addressing the causes of hunger.  
 
The Hunger Task Force and Ireland 
What might these failures say about the place in which it emerged – Ireland – and on 
which it reflects? There are two issues here. The first is about how the HTF fits within 
Irish government efforts to occupy a prominent place in the world. The second follows on 
from the first but brings into focus economic changes in Ireland and how the HTF 
connects with them.  
 
Ireland in the world  
Certainly, immediately prior to its economic collapse from 2008 onwards (but perhaps 
even to this day), Ireland’s political class promoted a vision of the country’s rightful 
place among the world’s leading states. Its wealth was such, for example, that the least it 
could do was aim to meet the UN’s target of overseas development assistance of 0.7% of 
GDP. But Ireland’s aim was to become more than just a donor. Countering views of 
Ireland as just another recipient of structural aid and inward investment on Europe’s 
periphery (consider that, much to the annoyance of its leading politicians, Ireland is 
sometimes referred to as one of the crisis-hit ‘PIGS’ – Portugal, Italy / Ireland, Greece 
and Spain), efforts such as the HTF are intended to underscore Ireland’s capacity to lead 
and not least alongside the United States. In Ireland, therefore, it is viewed as a success 
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that US Secretary of State, Hilary Rodham-Clinton, has co-sponsored one outcome of the 
HTF report, the 1,000 Days partnership, which aims to ‘scale up’ nutrition and end child 
malnutrition. Indeed, as Kevin Farrell, Ireland’s Hunger Envoy, noted in a 2010 
parliamentary hearing: 
 
On reflection, when looking back on recent years, it is in the area of 
advocacy that Ireland has made its most significant contribution. We have 
done some great work in agriculture. We have also done some great work, 
and are doing even more, in respect of nutrition but it is in the area of 
advocacy that we are having a real impact. I was in New York last 
September to attend the launch of the 1,000 Days initiative, that is, the 
1,000 Days nutrition programme that was co-hosted by […] the Secretary 
of State, Ms [sic] Clinton. […] While the meeting itself was a hugely 
significant event, the important point is that Ireland is now working 
closely with a major player, namely, the United States, which is actively 
and enthusiastically working with us on this initiative (Farrell 2010; my 
emphasis) 
 
This quotation says a lot about how the work of the HTF and its report is intended to fit 
within Ireland’s broader diplomatic goals. Not only is the aim for Ireland to become the 
‘Norway of hunger’, but Ireland’s effort to lead the (purported) fight against hunger aims 
to portray a particular image of the country: one that builds on the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom, 
which encouraged the Irish government to think about how it could occupy a new place 
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on the world stage. Indeed, some boom-time Irish geopolitical maneuvers entailed 
purposively cultivating a view that Ireland was ‘between Boston and Berlin’ (Finn, 2011) 
– a place that combined the ‘best’ of US and European political and economic ideas and 
policies (e.g. a light-touch regulatory environment from the US and a European-style 
welfare state). But Ireland also developed a narrative about its capacity to be a bridging 
state that could help the US and Europe to communicate with each other. This was a 
strategic stance, not least because Ireland definitely had to look to its west and to its east: 
inward investment from the US, for example, was a central aspect of Ireland’s boom, but 
so too was the flow of funds from Europe that helped educate Ireland’s workforce and 
improve its infrastructure (e.g. see Kitchin and Bartley, 2007).  
 
Given this context, it makes sense to imagine that interventions such as the HTF report 
would seek to conform with, rather than challenge, mainstream views on hunger. What, 
for example, would the HTF need to avoid if it wanted to be taken seriously by foreign 
politicians, diplomats, and civil servants (not least by such people in the United States)? 
Would statements about corporate control over the global food economy have much 
mileage? Consider here the central role of TNCs in the production of hunger, an issue the 
HTF report ignored. The Irish government wanted support from the United States. Yet, as 
the 2009 World Investment Report documents, of the 10 largest TNCs in five sectors of 
the agribusiness economy, 30% of the firms are from the US (UNCTAD, 2009). A 
critique of TNCs, or discussing something approximate to the corporate food regime, 
which would implicate US trade policy (see Weis, 2007: 68-69), would not have gone 
down too well.  
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 These points about Ireland’s stance on hunger suggest that the pressure on states and 
agents mandated by them to remain diplomatic in their dealings regarding development 
curtails the scope for real, adequate, and critical analysis to emerge. Further, whilst there 
is a ‘will to intervene’ (Robinson, 2008) among states in the context of a world of 
humanitarian crises, the geopolitical imagination that drives such interventions is always 
tempered by other and often competing interests. In Ireland’s case, the HTF failed to 
explain hunger as a product of (or even in any way connected to) an unfair trade system 
propped up by rich-world national governments to benefit their corporations, or by poor-
world governments to protect their domestic elite allies. But the HTF report also fails to 
consider that Ireland is a major recipient of EU agricultural subsidies; subsidies that are 
widely recognized as a contributing factor to the difficulties facing agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa (e.g. see Heinisch, 2006). Between 2000 and 2009, for example, farmers 
and agribusinesses in Ireland received almost €17.4bn (Pers. comm. from Central 
Statistics Office, 2011). By point of comparison, Ireland’s development assistance during 
the same period totaled €5.84bn. Although these figures are not exactly comparable 
(ODA stems from government funds, whereas agricultural subsidies flow to private 
individuals and businesses), Irish agriculture nevertheless gains from the subsidy regime.  
 
Based on the above discussion, it is hard not to conclude that the HTF report was part of 
a discursive process of misrepresentation and avoidance; about coordinating the illusion 
of doing something serious about causes, when in reality it only seeks to address effects, 
admirable as that may be. Like the legitimizing discourses and indeed cultural politics 
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that ‘constructed consent’ (Harvey, 2003: 39-63) for neoliberalization via the making of 
arguments about the state, say, or the way the market was represented as the solution to 
society’s ills (see also Frank, 2000), the HTF report legitimizes corporate control over the 
global food economy insofar as it defends private sector expansion in the agricultural 
sector, refuses to acknowledge the corporate food regime’s failings, and fails to attack 
trade rules. That the report spent its time and resources enrolling experts and collecting 
evidence, whilst receiving ‘buy-in’ from some ‘stakeholders’ (e.g. Catholic charities in 
Ireland’s HTF report) and excluding others (e.g. La Via Campesina, which the report 
ignored), but failed to acknowledge the role of corporate control over the global food 
economy, leads me to argue that it misused those resources. The outcome, then, is a 
‘development smokescreen’ which hides the real forces and structures at work in the 
production of hunger and the position of Ireland within those structures.  
 
Ireland’s emerging corporate foodscape 
A second set of issues that deserves attention here is about how the HTF report connects 
with Ireland’s emerging corporate-dominated foodscape, which Sage (2010: 100) argues, 
‘is more powerful and extensive than ever’. He notes for example that, ‘the spread of 
corporate food retailing, dominating the landscapes of suburban areas and towns and 
further exacerbating dependence upon cars, represents one of the most significant 
features of the “Celtic Tiger” era’ (p.95). A crucial point in this context is that corporate 
retailers’ power stems in part from the Irish government’s decision in 2005 to abolish the 
Groceries Order, thereby allowing retailers to attempt to gain market share by attracting 
consumers with below-cost goods, not least alcohol products. This change gave a serious 
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boost to the larger retailers, who now dominate the retail market. Indeed, Ireland’s largest 
retailers, such as ‘Dunnes Stores, Tesco and SuperValu account for 70% of the retail 
grocery market in Ireland, one of the highest levels of retail concentration in the EU’ 
(Campbell, 2009). As is the case in other contexts (e.g. see Patel, 2007: 215-252), the 
retailers’ buying power has knock-on effects for small-scale farmers because, ‘[w]ith 
corporate retailers competing aggressively for market share, growers have come under 
exceptionally intense pressure as they shoulder the consequences of special promotions 
and discounts such as “buy one get one free”’ (Sage, 2010: 95).  
 
Not only have corporate retailers flexed their muscles over small-scale farmers, but 
Ireland’s corporate sector has also managed to exert pressure on Irish governments to 
construct a regulatory regime that grants them considerable power. Taylor and Millar 
(2004) shed light on one example. They note that, in the context of ‘food scares’ and 
consumer anxiety about food safety (see also Jackson, 2010), ‘the Fianna 
Fáil/Progressive Democrat (FF/PD) coalition in 1997 opted to replace a myriad of 
governmental bodies responsible for food safety in Ireland with a “super agency” that 
would have sweeping powers’ (p.595). This shift was ‘undertaken in a manner fully 
cognizant of the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) which ensures that 
measures taken to protect food safety impact as little as possible on free trade. (p.601). 
And reflecting the Irish state’s broader willingness to work in coalition with the private 
sector, the new agency, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, has a consultative council 
on which the agri-business community has representation. According to Taylor and 
Millar, this arrangement ‘formalizes privileged access’ (p.599) to agriculture and food 
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sector corporations and offers them ‘invaluable access’ (p.602) to the FSAI. The FSAI 
also passes the burden of truly judging food safety risks onto individual consumers. It 
passes on scientific information but consumers must decide what they want to consume. 
In so doing the FSAI formalizes ‘the preference of multi-national capital that if no risk is 
proven, it is not risky’ (p.600).  
 
I argue that the upshot of all these policy initiatives is that Irish government policy has 
cultivated a corporate-friendly space economy in the food sector. Large retailers are 
among the winners. But Irish food processors have also done well. Indeed, the foodscape 
has been the springboard for two Irish corporations ranking in UNCTAD’s list of the 
world’s 50 largest food and beverage TNCs (ranked by foreign assets): Kerry Group (at 
position 38) and Greencore (at 46). In contrast, only one Irish corporation, CRH (at 83), 
ranks in UNCTAD’s list of the largest 100 non-financial TNCs (UNCTAD, 2009). 
Ireland’s agri-TNCs are punching well above their weight and it is no coincidence that 
they originate from a state that has sought to promote their emergence.  
 
Some aspects of Greencore’s story are especially instructive for the purposes of this 
paper. Greencore is the name of the former state-run sugar corporation which was 
privatized in 1991 and which has since then grown to become a large player in Europe’s 
convenience food sector. Its privatization was controversial, in part because it was 
botched by Irish stockbrokers (Irish Times, 1993) but also because it was the first of a 
wave of privatizations via which the Irish state neo-liberalized the economy. Following 
flotation, Greencore expanded rapidly by acquiring firms throughout Ireland, Europe, and 
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the world. But retrenchment occurred alongside expansion. In 2005, for example, 
Greencore gave indication of its intentions by closing its sugar refining plant in Carlow, a 
move the government defended thus:  
 
The recent decision by Greencore Group plc — Irish Sugar Limited to 
close its sugar plant in Carlow and to consolidate all of its sugar 
manufacturing in Mallow was a commercial decision taken by the board 
[…] Greencore’s rationalisation programme involves an investment of €20 
million to €25 million which clearly demonstrates a commitment to 
maintaining an efficient sugar processing industry in Ireland (Coughlan, 
2005). 
 
One year later, Greencore used payments from the European Commission to close its last 
remaining sugar plant in Mallow, County Cork, which employed 230 workers. Sugar 
farmers who supplied the factory also received compensation from the EC. However, in a 
report on European Commission (EC) spending released in November 2010, the 
European Court of Auditors found that the EC had mistakenly paid Greencore and Irish 
sugar beet farmers a total of €131m. The payment was questionable because Greencore 
used 2001 production figures to justify closing the Mallow plant; yet figures from later in 
the decade showed that the plant would still have been profitable today. So why did 
Greencore want to close its factory? The key issue was the potential value of the 160 
hectare site for property development (Irish Times, 2011): why operate a factory when 
the site could be transformed into apartments? Greencore, which was part-owned by a 
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prominent Irish property developer, had caught the Irish property market bug. Needless to 
say, in the context of Ireland’s collapsed property bubble, the undeveloped factory site 
now holds nowhere near the sort of value Greencore expected it would. At the time of 
writing (June 2011), Greencore’s share price has dropped almost 78% since its peak in 
2007. 
 
In many respects, the Greencore story is emblematic of Ireland’s woe: misplaced faith in 
speculative property investments. But attention to the Greencore case and recognizing the 
company’s prominence within Ireland’s domestic capitalist class reminds us that the 
country’s agrarian sector remains important: the boom might have helped Ireland to 
change positions in the international division of labor, but the agrarian sector still has a 
strong presence within Irish society and economy. Indeed, as the size of Kerry Group and 
Greencore indicates, some of domestic Irish capitalism’s greatest ‘successes’ are in the 
agribusiness sector. It goes without saying that the corporate food regime empowers 
prominent Irish firms. Crucially, as Ireland tries to map a route towards economic 
recovery, it is becoming increasingly clear that government policy will try to strengthen 
its position here. Food exports from Ireland are already worth approximately €8bn each 
year. Ireland is the largest EU exporter of dairy products and the fourth largest beef 
exporter in the world. And although most of Ireland’s food exports stay within the EU 
(e.g. 99% of beef exports are sold in EU states), its farming and agribusiness sector 
stands to gain from new EU trade deals, such as the opening of Turkey’s market to EU 
beef exports in January 2011 (RTE, 2011). The revised Cotonou Agreement between the 
EU and 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific also holds out the 
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prospect that Ireland can capture new markets. For a small capitalist economy such as 
Ireland, it is no surprise that state policy is slanted towards capturing new export markets. 
From the perspective of the state, then, the pro-corporate transformation of Ireland’s 
domestic foodscape and the success of corporations such as Kerry Group and Greencore 
is something to be celebrated. But what is striking about the HTF report is not only that it 
failed to consider the corporate food regime but also that it ignored Ireland’s position 
within it. As with the report’s silence on the issue of EU agricultural subsidies, Ireland is 
not registered as a player with a strong vested interest in the politics of food and hunger, 
but rather as a coordinator or referee. The HTF claimed it wanted to tackle the root 
causes of hunger, but the reality is that some of domestic Irish capitalism’s best prospects 
lie in the continued survival of the same global food economy that produces hunger. 
Truly trying to prevent hunger – truly aiming for ‘nothing less than its eradication’ – 
would entail Ireland acknowledging its role in the subsidy regime and then seeking to 
move towards a radically different stance on the world stage. 
 
Conclusion 
The HTF was one realization of boom-time Ireland’s new vision for itself; the sense that 
Ireland could act out a new role on the global stage. In trying to play out this new role, 
however, Ireland confronts numerous contradictions. For example, the HTF’s purported 
drive to tackle hunger is undermined by Ireland’s determination to form alliances with 
the U.S. and by the reality that domestic Irish capitalism is pinning its hopes on future 
profits from companies such as Greencore leading the economy out of its current crisis. 
Further, at the same time as the agrarian sector’s historical and cultural meaning in 
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Ireland compels its political and civil society to form the HTF and take a stance on the 
global development stage, the agrarian sector’s other side – its contemporary material 
meaning – relies on the reproduction of relations, networks, institutions, and structures 
that help create the precise condition of hunger that the HTF purports to attack. The HTF 
failed to deal with these contradictions. Rather, it aims to pursue agrarian changes in 
developing countries but without also addressing the emerging and highly problematic 
place of Ireland’s agrarian sector. Thus, insofar as it invokes Ireland’s historical 
experience of famine and hunger as a reason for intervening on the global development 
stage, the HTF and its report actually exploits the tragic history of Ireland’s agrarian 
sector whilst promoting – or at the very least, not damaging – its contemporary 
geopolitical and economic interests. At the point at which Ireland’s attempt to speak up 
and be heard had the chance to say something meaningful, serious, and critical about the 
causes of a form suffering that it had known so deeply – hunger – its representatives on 
the HTF bailed out.  
 
Given the scale of its economic crisis, another sort of bail out (led by the European 
Central Bank and the IMF) now preoccupies Ireland. The confidence with which Ireland 
sought to make its mark on the world stage – the sense that Ireland was going to be, like 
Norway, a resource-abundant country that could tackle global problems – has been 
eroded. And at least in part because of the crisis, it now looks highly unlikely that 
Ireland’s (once much-lauded) ODA will reach the United Nations 0.7% of GDP target by 
2012. Nevertheless, the government’s Hunger Envoy continues his work and some of the 
reforms called for in the HTF report are being implemented. And so there remains some 
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scope for post-crisis Irish governments to pursue a new stance on the production of 
hunger. Rather than situating its efforts within the development space of other nation-
states and their diplomatic classes, perhaps Ireland might begin to position its agenda on 
hunger relative to some of the grassroots, bottom-up players that constitute organizations 
such as La Vía Campesina (Desmarais, 2007) and that argue for an agro-ecological 
solution to hunger (Pretty, 2009). The HTF report did not do justice to the memory of 
Ireland’s Famine; but future efforts could begin to rectify that. 
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